World trade organisation;Agriculture and India

{Amidst various contentious issues of dispute between India and WTO,this was written as an assignment and various references were were used which have been mentioned at the end of the work}


Indian is no exception to these general trends, with a few special features. During last two decades India’s agricultural exports as a part of total merchandise exports have continued to decline from the preponderant position they occupied in the pre-independence. But with the achievement of self-sufficiency in food grains and some other major agricultural commodities, which used to account for large portion of import bill, overall imports of agricultural commodities have sharply declined. The outlay on agricultural imports as a proportion of earnings from agricultural exports has progressively declined, and all the balance has become progressively more favourable. Discussion on these issues has, naturally, to take into account the new trade regime as the stated objective of firstly to study the performance of India’s agricultural exports under WTO regime. Secondly, to analyze the competitiveness of top agri-exports of India under WTO regime. Finally, to suggest policy measures in the identified India’s agricultural. In the first part of discuss briefly introduce, the developments in agricultural trade specially the agricultural exports at the world level in the recent years and discuss the performance of Indian agriculture in this respect finally shaped the shifts in this policy. Final part, I will try to spell out the ingredients of a strategy to augment agricultural exports in the changing, and more demanding, global economy.



According to the Indian Census 2001, the share of cultivators and agriculture labourers in the total labour force of India declined from 64.8 per cent in 1991 to 58.2 per cent in 2001, while the share of agriculture value added in total value added of the country dropped from 31.3 per cent to 24.5 per cent. Thus, a 6.8 per cent shift in the output from agriculture to non-agriculture resulted in a shift of just about 6.6 per cent labour from farming to non-farming sector. If this were the case, then even if the share of agriculture is completely overtaken by the other sectors, the problem of huge income inequality between rural and urban will remain daunting. The ratio of income defining the poverty line in urban and rural India has increased from 1.29 in 1983-84 to 1.4 in 1999-00. Nevertheless, the urban-rural income differential in India is much smaller than that of developed countries (Table 1). In order to bridge these inequalities, the developed countries generally tend to resort to heavy subsidies to their agricultural sector. The rural-urban divide in India is increasing steadily and it would have to face the same problem as other developed countries are facing at present (Table 1). However, India could not afford to employ the same balancing strategy as practiced by the developed countries of providing subsidy to the agricultural sector, because its rural population is very large.

Therefore, the solution to reduce the rural-urban divide in India lies in employment-generating large-scale industrialization and expansion of agriculture processing and exports, so that each percentage point shift in the share of agriculture value added to other sectors leads to at least two percentages points shift in the labour force from farm sector to non-farm sector. Maintaining this target itself will inherently lead to a comparable growth in per capita income of the farm sector.

Agreement on Agriculture (A-o-A) and India


The success of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing has given legitimate boosts and seriousness to multilateral trading system. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which promised to put an end to the country-by-country quotas on imports of textiles and clothing imposed by the major developed countries including the United States and European Union became a reality from January 1, 2005. On the other hand, the success of the Agreement on Agriculture in liberalizing agriculture was less than expected but it has opened the door to future liberalization and concrete results are expected in near future.

Agreement on Agriculture (A-o-A) or URAA:

The core objective of A-o-A is to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system. Its implementation period was six years for developed countries and nine for developing countries, starting with the date the agreement came into effect – January 1, 1995. These dates are now extended under a built-in provision of A-o-A of own review and renewal. That renegotiation is now underway, under the terms set at the fourth WTO ministerial conference in Doha and the Framework Decision agreed at the WTO General Council on August 1, 2004. The AoA comprises three sections referred to as three pillars of the agreement:

1. Market access,

2. Domestic support and

3. Export subsidies.


However at the outset, the agreement notes that the reform program should be made in an equitable way among all Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the environment; having regard to the agreement that special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into account the possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform program on least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. In addition, there are provisions of Special Products and Sensitive Products, which are to be exempted from stringent discipline of the above provisions of the A-o- A



Provision of Special Products designates a certain number of products of the developing countries that would be exempt from tariff reduction requirements and other disciplines in order to protect and promote food production, livelihood security and rural development. The key issues here are associated with the mechanism to decide on country-w ise crops. In the case of developed countries also, certain products, based on political, social and cultural considerations are designated as Sensitive Products, which will be treated less stringently. Here the main dispute lies between the United States, which has proposed 1 per cent of the tariff lines for such products while the EU is asking for 8 per cent of the tariff line.


Market Access: 

 The market access requires that tariffs fixed by individual countries be cut progressively to allow free trade. Since different countries fixed their tariffs at different levels confronting the interest of each other, several harmonizing formula such as Uruguay Round formula , Swiss formula, Girard formula, and Canadian “income tax” formula were suggested to cut tariffs in which steeper cuts are suggested on higher tariffs, so as to bring all the international tariffs closer to almost the same level. All these formula have unique coefficients with different effects. The developed countries preferred Swiss mathematical Formula in which the coefficients also determine the maximum tariff where the starting tariffs will end up. For example, if the coefficient is 20, then a very high starting tariff will end up with a national tariff of exactly 20 percent and lower starting tariffs will end up proportionately lower, close to 20 percent as well. The developing countries do not like this formula because it quickly brings them closure to the competition, a situation they are not prepared. The key arguments is that the developed countries want to deprive developing countries a facility that has been extensively used by them to achieve current state of their economy.

Other formulae are more flexible. For example the formula used in the Uruguay Round for agricultural tariff reductions required that tariffs be cut by a percentage average over a number of years; in that the developed countries agreed to cut tariffs by an average of 36 percent over six years with a minimum of 15 percent on each product; some cuts could be greater than others and thus the combination of average and minimum reductions allows countries the flexibility to vary their actual tariff reductions on individual products.

Domestic support and the little boxes

The A-o-A broadly subdivides domestic support programs into three boxes with colours, green, blue and amber and two other categories namely Development measures and de minimis. Under current WTO rules, countries are free to employ subsidies under the “green” and “blue” boxes, certain development measures, and the de minimis subsidies. In addition there are some Non-trade concerns (NTCs) listed in the preamble to the A-o-A, which can be used to legitimize government programs that run contrary to the market-oriented agricultural trading system. They include food security, rural development and environmental protection. The European Union wants to include animal welfare and eco-labeling as NTCs. 

Development measures cover direct or indirect permitted (A-o-A article 6.2) assistance aimed at encouraging agricultural and rural development in developing countries and is allowed. They include investment subsidies generally available to agriculture such as research and development, extension programs, and soil and water conservation; and agricultural input subsidies available to low-income or resource-poor farmers such as fertilizer, water, and electricity. Under the de minimis provision, developed countries are allowed to use other subsidies with an aggregate value of up to 5 percent of the total value of domestic agricultural production in the case of developed countries and 10 per cent in the case of developing countries.

The Amber Box (A-o-A Article 6) contains category of domestic support that is scheduled for reduction based on a formula called the “Aggregate Measure of Support” (AMS). The AMS calculates the amount of money spent by governments on agricultural production, except for those contained in the Blue Box, Green Box and de minimis. It required member countries to report their total AMS for the period between 1986 and 1988, bind it, and reduce it according to an agreed-upon schedule. Developed countries agreed to reduce these figures by 20% over six years starting in 1995. Developing countries  agreed to make 13% cuts over 10 years. Least-developed countries do not need to make any cuts.

Export support

 Export support include trade distorting programs such as Export Subsidy, State Trading Enterprises 2 Export Credits, Special and Differential Treatment, Special Products, and Sensitive Products aimed at benefiting the domestic producers against the international competition. A-o-A tends to eliminate or minimize such supports. Export subsidies are government payments to the exporting firms directed to encourage use of inputs from the domestic resources. Accordingly, an export subsidy program will pay the difference between a more expensive domestic input and a cheaper imported alternative in order to encourage exporters to buy inputs from domestic market. Dairy products and sugar in EU continue to receive considerable export subsidies. The U.S. Step 2 program subsidizes its cotton production through U.S. exporting firms. Export credits given by a government to underwrite the cost of doing business on commercial terms also amounts to export subsidy. Often, the United States is criticized for such policies where the United States Government gives credit to its domestic companies to deliver goods in another country but the payments are recovered from the importing countries government in long instalments and cheaper interest rate making it more lucrative for the poor countries to import from the United States. This is also one of the major points of dispute between the United States and the EU and it is now agreed that such credit line will not exceed 180 days.

 Doha Round:

Brief of the package encompassing A-o-A .The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Doha , Qatar from 9 to 14 November 2001. In fact, the Doha Ministerial was a starting of a new round with unique feature foc used on implementation of A-o-A and “Development” of the developing countries so that they could meaningfully become part of the agreement.

 Article XVII of the GATT 1994 deals with state trading enterprises and their operations multilateral global trading system. The following Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cancun, Mexico from 10 to 14 September 2003 was dedicated to stock taking of progress in negotiations and other work under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). However, the DDA required correcting the imbalances that penalize developing countries and improve the commitment of WTO members. The modalities3 for the Doha Round are to be completed by the end of April 2006, the draft schedule based on these modalities by 31 July 2006 and the Round is expected to conclude by the end of 2006, a date chosen carefully for the Ministerial Meeting when the term of ‘Trade Promotion Authority of the United States’ ends. In this round the latest Ministerial was held in Hong Kong Ministerial (Dec 13-18, 2005), which has given some hope for success as for the first time developing countries have managed to get a mention from developed countries of reduction in their subsidies otherwise most of the previous commitments have been falsified. The issues related to implementation of A-o-A dominate the Doha Round and they include:

1. High agriculture trade distorting subsidies granted by rich countries.

2. Agriculture export subsidies .

3. High tariffs on exports of agricultural and industrial products of interest to developing countries .

However, at various Ministerial negotiations new items from other agenda have been added to make it a comprehensive round. For example, the modalities of the A-o-A are being coupled with GATS, and investment issues. Therefore, the proposals for negotiation have transformed to include among others the following (list of all items is provided in following sub-section):

1. On agriculture, 2013 as the end date for the elimination of export subsidies with an important part frontloaded by 2010 .

2. Agreement that the EU, US and Japan will undertake the biggest reductions on agricultural subsidies that distort trade and that these will be effective cuts, which is a serious improvement as compared to the previous round.

3. On cotton, which is of key importance to many African countries, export subsidies on cotton to be eliminated by 2006 and cuts to domestic subsidies will be greater and faster than for the rest of products.

4. Special agriculture products and a safeguard to protect those agricultural products of developing countries with concerns about livelihood security, food security and rural development .

5. On industrial products, a Swiss formula to cut tariffs, with high tariffs subject to bigger cuts, thus addressing tariffs peaks and tariff escalation in particular on products of interest for developing countries. Developing countries will for a start cut tariffs only in proportion to the cuts by developed countries.

6. A step forward towards a completely duty-free and quota -free access for the world poorest country Members of the WTO .

7. On Services, the door has been opened to plurilateral negotiations .

8. Countries have started tabling collective requests in the services of sectors that are of particular interest to them.

9. Aid for Trade package, to help developing countries address their supply-side constraints.


India’s Ministerial Positions at Doha rounds and on A-o-A 

Pascal Lamy, WTO General Secretary visited India on April 5 2006 for the second time in last six months, which is an indicator of the gravity of problems being faced by Indians in meeting the demands of developed countries. The Indian position is that the development agenda and the farmers’ interest cannot be diluted and that the industrial and agriculture issues should not be mixed, while at the same time the Indian negotiators feel that no change is made in subsidy position of the developed countries, yet new elements are being introduced. Nevertheless the Indian leadership has come up to the age of globalization and is slowly shedding its defensive posture and it has been demonstrating dynamism in the WTO negotiations. India rejected the idea of introducing new issues such as Investment, Competition, Trade Facilitation or Transparency in Government Procurement, and did not consider the basic trade principles like non-discrimination or market  access appropriate for dealing with issues like Investment and Competition. The Minister for Commerce and Industry raised the concerns that sensitive industries in developing countries including small-scale industries, which sustain a large labour force, could be destroyed. India was firmly opposed to any linkage between trade and labour standards and recalled that the Singapore Declaration had once and for all dealt with this issue and there was no need to refer to it again. Similarly, on environment, India was strongly opposed to the use of environmental measures for protectionist purposes and to imposition of unilateral trade restrictive measures and considered that the existing WTO rules were adequate to deal with all legitimate environmental concerns. In fact the Minister termed them as Trojan horses of protectionism.Doha Ministerial was saved from failure to continue the work program. The African countries, deserted Indian hopes because they were promised the continuation of their trade preferences into the EU marke t for some more years. However, to the windfall pleasure of India, the round was launched with services brought into the fold of international rules through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

At the Cancun Ministerial (10-14 September 2003), India felt that the draft Cancún Ministerial Text was grossly inadequate on implementation issues, precision, operational and effectiveness and fixing responsibility and would severely affect the interests of developing countries in agriculture, industrial tariffs and Singapore issues. There was no progress in removing barriers to export from developing countries to the developed countries. India argued that all the time-lines set at Doha for their resolution have been breached. On certain issues even the mandate itself has been questioned. To make matters worse, the draft Ministerial text accords low priority to these issues. It does not envisage any time-frame for taking decisions for resolving outstanding issues. This is in sharp contrast to the issues of interest to developed countries for which time-lines have been provided for taking decisions. On agriculture subsidies, India argued that the prevailing subsidies in the developed countries were not targeted to keeping small struggling family farms  in business but to provide hefty rents to large farmers or corporates. On the other hand, against equity, justice and fair play, developing countries are being asked to liberalize their agriculture. India felt there was an urgent need to bring down the high tariffs and non-tariff barriers on products of export interest to developing countries while ensuring that special and differential treatment for developing countries and policy space to deal with sensitive products remain an integral part of all elements of negotiations. India reiterates that under no circumstances can it accept any form or harmonization of tariffs in agriculture or obligations to create and expand tariff rate quotas.

On market access negotiations on non-agricultural products (NAMA), India favored the formula mandated by the Doha Declaration, without any amendment in any aspect of the formula.


Contentious issues and on-going Debate

The main complaint about policies supporting domestic prices, subsidized production and subsidised exports is that they encourage over-production. This works as deterrent to imports and promotes low-priced dumping on world markets. However, there are also arguments in favour of subsidies, particularly in the case of net importers of agriculture products. Such countries do benefit from imports at suppressed prices, (see for example (Panagariya, 2005). Nevertheless, depending on prolonged food aid program could render a country net importer of food due to the dependency created by circumstances and could discourage domestic production. Once such a vicious circle is created it becomes difficult to come out of it.

Agriculture subsidies

About 84 percent of farmer households in India survive with less than 2.0 hectare of land with average size of their holding being 0.63 hectare, while average size of all holdings in India is just about 1.4 hectare. Survival of such farmers is at stake if they do not get alternative means of livelihood. Where will these farmers get employment if Indian markets are flooded with foreign agricultural products under the market access program?  In India the product-specific support is negative, while the non-product specific support i.e., subsidies on agricultural inputs, such as, power, irrigation, fertilisers etc., is well below the permissible level of 10 per cent of the value of agricultural output. Therefore, India is under no obligation to reduce domestic support currently extended to the agricultural sector. Yet, subsidies are wisely considered burden in India and they are being rationalized. On the other hand, domestic subsidies in OECD countries during 2002 accounted for about US$ 226.5 billion (Table 6), which has increased to US$279.5 billion in 2004. United States spent US$4 billion as subsidy to support its 25,000 cotton producers (US$160, 000 per producer) in 2003. 4

It is also argued that in countries such as United States, subsidies are enjoyed by a selected few, mostly producing corn, wheat, cotton, soybean, and rice, while growers of 400 other crops hardly get any such subsidy. Because of income and price support programs, the farmers in OECD countries are reported to use high levels of pesticides, fertilizers and herbicides in order to increase productivity of the land and maximize profits. But, these acts also lead to pollution of rivers and lakes. Therefore, in overall assessment, it is argued that the social benefits of subsidies may be much less and deserve to be curtailed (Cooper 2004) and also see information uploaded at Table (6) compares 2002 values of subsidy for India and selected OECD countries. Subsidy constitutes almost 54 percent of the agriculture value added in OECD as compared to seven per cent in India. This figure will further go down when taken as percentage of value of agriculture output. Opposition to subsidy is also from within than outside. In the case of United States six reasons are promoted to kill farm subsidy: (1) Lower Food Prices for American Families, (2) Lower Costs and increased Exports for American Companies, (3) Budget Savings and Equity for the U.S. Tax Payers, (4) More Environment friendly Land Use, (5) Lager Market for U.S. Farmers


Oxfam, “Agriculture Dumping in Africa.” July 8, 2003.

Economic Diversification for Rural America, and (6) A more Hospitable World (Griswold, Slivinsy and Preble 2006).It is not that, the farmers in OECD countries will become jobless if subsidies are removed. The population dependency on farm is extremely thin in these countries. It is not like India, where more than 60 per cent of the population depends on farm. In OECD countries the farmers can easily switch to better options quickly as demonstrated in New Zealand, which was heavily subsidizing its sheep farmers until 1984. The sheep farm subsidy was completely removed within a span of one year after 1984 and today New Zealand is one of the least subsidized countries among OECD countries, with a subsidy incidence of just about 0.3 billion (3 per cent of total farm receipt as compared to 30 per cent in OECD)5 in 2004.

India’s Readiness: Agriculture Policy Regime

As a general policy of trade reforms in India, some 1,400 quantitative restrictions including those on agriculture products were replaced by the custom tariffs. While tariff rates have been declining and aimed to achieve the level of ASEAN countries, the average MFN tariff7 is still over 20 per cent. However, almost all the tariff lines in the case of agriculture are bound 8

The MFN tariff is based on “standard” rates of duty, which are statutory tariffs and may only be changed through legislation. Binding plays an important role in signalling to the business community an upper limit for possible tariff increases. As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, India had bound about 67 per cent of its tariff lines, while applied tariff were kept below bound rates. Subsequently, India submitted rectification and modifications of its schedule under Article XXVIII: 1 of the GATT, 1994 and increased the number of bound tariffs from 67%, to 72.4% in 2001. Bindings have been undertaken for previously unbound products, such as textiles and clothing, while India renegotiated some commitments on previously bound . applied tariff on agriculture products in 2004 was about 49 per cent while the average bound rate was 125 per cent. In addition, anti-dumping measures have become an important element in India’s trade policy.With the removal of QRs on India’s imports, apprehensions have been expressed that such removal may impact the domestic producers adversely and result in a surge and dumping of imports into the country. However, necessary mechanisms have been put in place to provide adequate protection and a level playing field to domestic players vis-à-vis imports. Appropriate tariffication, at peak customs duty, have been effected for these QRs. A number of agricultural and horticultural products placed on the free list of imports in earlier years have also been brought to the peak rate to ensure adequate protection to Indian farmers. Tariff binding for such products have also been renegotiated at substantially higher levels. For sensitive agricultural products, suitable enabling provision has been made to fix the statutory tariff rates at appropriate high levels. It has also been decided to amend the 1992 Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act for vesting the Government with necessary powers to impose QRs as a temporary safeguard measure. EXIM Policy announced on 31.3.2001 further provides for the following measures to protect the domestic producers:  Import of agricultural products like wheat, rice, maize, other coarse cereals, copra and coconut oil has been placed in the category of State Trading. The nominated State Trading Enterprise will conduct the imports of these commodities solely as per commercial considerations. Similarly, import of petroleum products including petrol, diesel and ATF has also been placed in the category of State Trading. Import of urea will also be done through the mechanism of State Trading.Imports have also been made subject to various existing domestic regulations like Food Adulteration Act and Rules there under, Meat Food Product Order, Tea Waste (Control Order) and import of textile material using the prohibited dyes has been banned. To ensure that import of agricultural products do not lead to unwanted Infiltration of exotic diseases and pests in the country, it has been decided to subject imports of all primary products of plant and animal origin to ëBio .Security & Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Permití. Import of foreign liquor, processed food products and tea wastes have been subjected to already existing domestic regulations concerning health and hygiene.

. What are the main features of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture which are of concern to India?

. The main features of the WTO Agreement in Agriculture which are of concern to India are:

i)                   India has been maintaining Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) on import of 825 agricultural products as on 1.4.1997. Under the provisions of the Agreement, such Quantitative Restrictions will have to be eliminated. India has sought to remove them in three phases within an overall time frame of six years upto 31.3.2003. These Quantitative Restrictions will have to be replaced with appropriate tariffs.

ii)                ii) The Agreement also imposes constraints on the level of domestic support provided to the agricultural sector. In India’s case, it may have in future some implications on minimum support prices given to farmers and on the subsidies given on agricultural inputs. However, the Agreement allows us to provide domestic supportto the extent of 10% of the total value of agricultural produce.

iii)               Disciplines on export subsidy do not affect us as India is not providing any export subsidy on agricultural products.

iv) The Agreement allows unlimited support to activities such as (i) research, pest diseases control, training, extension, and advisoryservices; (ii) public stock holding for food security purposes; (iii) domestic food aid; and (iv) Income insurance and food needs, relief from natural disasters and payments under the environmental assistance programmes. Moreover, investment subsidies given for development of agricultural infrastructure or any kind of support given to low income and resource poor farmers are exempt from any commitments. Most of our major rural and agricultural development programmes are covered under these provisions. Therefore, the Agreement does not constrain our policies of investments in these areas.


Though India has demonstrated that there exists broad political support to its economic reform programme, as has been proved by the transition of several Governments in the last decade through the political space, agricultural trade policy reforms need to be accelerated much more than what has been done so far. The challenge is to mitigate the inefficiency that exists in the Indian agriculture to close the gap between its potential and actual performances through a proper policy framework. India being a net exporter in agriculture products, it has more to gain from the trade reforms. It has sufficiently high bound rates on most of the products and therefore, flexibility can be ensured against unfair competition. India does not have to worry about its subsidy, as it is already below the required line and it also does not have any domestic support to recon with. All these place India in an advantageous position. Moreover, the ongoing negotiations are likely to yield enough flexibility in product choice and tariff selection. A multilateral trading system is in the interest of India, given the fact that it is placed in such a situation where no clear group fits well. Therefore, India should work towardthe success of the Doha round and in the mean time make use of the opportunity to reform its domestic market to bring in more efficiency. The interests of India are certainly at variance from the common interest of least developed countries, which became amply clear during the Tokyo and Doha Ministerials, when the least developed countries left India alone. Many of these countries are net importers of food and the subsidy in the exporting countries makes them better off. Moreover, under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative of the European Union, the LDCs have quota- and duty-free access to the EU market9, a facility that was never available to India. The services sector for India is critical to its growth and increasing the pace of industrial growth is its necessity. With favourable bound rates for agriculture onboard, the Negotiating framework of India must be different from that of other developing

countries. The situation is highly tenacious for India, particularly in view of the fact that the developed countries have managed to link agriculture subsidy with the market access in services and industry. If the European Union needs to do more on agricultural tariffs, and the US needs to do more on reducing agricultural subsidies, then the G-20 group of countries, where India is a key member, are also needed to do more on industrial tariffs. This is a hard ball game. Moreover, all these issues are dynamically linked to the future agenda of the WTO inter-alia in terms of substantial opening up trade in services; rules governing transparency in bilateral trade agreements, anti-dumping and Traditionally, India has fallen prey to the group dynamics because its interests do not fully confirm to the least developed countries, whose cause it used to champion nor does it radically differ from those of developed countries, who it confronts. Therefore, the time has come for India to come out of ambiguity and take a rational step in the negotiation process to harness best of its own interests. Some sacrifices are worth taking in order to gain a wider market.



Anderson, Kym and Martin, Will (eds) 2005 Agricultural Trade Reform and the

Doha Development Agenda, New York: The World Bank and Palgrave


Bathla, Seema 2006 ‘Trade Policy Reforms and Openness of Indian Agriculture:

Analysis at the Comodity Level’, South Asia Economic Journal 7(1): 19-53.

Bhagwati, Jagdish 2005 ‘From Seattle to Hong Kong’, Foreign Affairs December

2005 — WTO Special Edition.

Birthal, P.S., Joshi, P.K. and Gulati, A. 2005 ‘High Value Food Commodities

and Vertical Coordination in India: Implications for Smallholders.”‘ Toward

High-Value Agriculture and Vertical Coordination: Implications for

Agribusiness and Smallholders, National Agricultural Science Centre, Pusa,

New Delhi, 7 March 2005.

Cooper, Sarah Fitzgerald 2004 ‘A Tough Row to Hoe’, Research Reports:

American Institute for Economic Research LXXI(18): 101-10







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